1 HE CONTRIBUTIONS made by behavioral scientists to psychosomatic medicine have been exhaustively reviewed. Alexander reports from the viewpoint of the dynamic psychiatrist, Mirsky from the position of the experimenter, Grinker from the standpoint of the clinical researcher, and Wittkower and Cleghorn discuss the sociopsychological concomitants of various disease entities. Historical and theoretical reviews by Kaplan and Kaplan, Mendelson et ah, and Gitelson round out the picture. In order to avoid duplication, therefore, I shall approach the same subject from a more epistemological and methodological point of view.
The mind-body and man-environment dichotomies of Western peoples are conceptual and linguistic devices which facilitate the study and control of nature. 55 Guided by a materialistic philosophy and dedicated to technological progress, nineteenth century scientists believed that the abstractions that were used so successfully in the exploration of the physical universe also could be applied to the study of psychological and social events. Subsequent This paper was delivered at the American Psychosomatic Society Annual Meeting, Montreal, Mar. 27, 1960 .
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VOL. XX11I, NO. 4, 1961 developments, however, proved them to be wrong. While for many centuries Zen Buddhists 5 "' fli) have been familiar with the vicissitudes of verbal language, Western scientists have only recently become aware of the relationship between language and thinking. 67 Today we know that abstractions, dichotomies, and other dialectic devices are a function of the language structure and that words do not necessarily reflect entities which occur in nature. Only towards the middle of the twentieth century did students of human behavior abstain from breaking entities into smaller component parts and avoid the pitfall of studying one feature in isolation from another. In order to retain the complex psychological and social aspects of behavior, they finally arrived at the "organism as a whole," "Gestalt," "being in the world," "relationship," and "social pattern" kind of abstractions. 33 The "Unity of Science" Dilemma In the health sciences, these newer viewpoints of man and nature led to the development of psychosomatic medicine, social psychiatry, and medical ecology. The previously split-off psyche thus was reunited with its soma, as was man with his environment. But laudable as these "wholeness" concepts were, they left unanswered the question of how to study a complex psychological or social phenomenon in view of
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man's limited perceptual capacity. A scientist can be in one place only and can observe or measure but a few aspects at any one time. Eventually it became evident that the difficulties encountered in the study of complex patterns are more a function of the limitations of the human observer-his methods of observation and his systems of symbolization-than of the intricacies of the subject matter itself. 47 To counteract the pattern-destroying tendency of scientific methods and to compensate for the limited capacity of the human observer, professionals found two solutions. Aware of the failures of the scientific method, the continental Europeans divorced themselves from the dictates of physical science and adhered to the tradition of the "Geisteswissenschaften" and "sciences morales et politiques." Recent outgrowths of this more intuitive and holistic approach are the various types of existential philosophies and therapies. 34 The Americans, in contrast, who believe that ten brains work better than one, adhered to the "unity of science" principle 39 and invented the team approach.
The Interdisciplinary Approach
American psychosomatic medicine thus shares with many neighboring disciplines the joys and sorrows of interdisciplinary methodology. 31 In this group approach, the increase in number of participating scientists certainly broadens the scope of observation, but it also introduces a new problem. While the solo scientist can devote his undivided attention to the study of the subject matter and deal with his reports later, the interdisciplinary investigator has to contend with the problem of symbolic systems from the beginning. 48 He meets communication difficulties of three distinct kinds: first, the vicissitudes of personal contact, when scientists of different backgrounds meet. Second, the confusions which arise because the data are expressed in words. (Any vocabulary is based upon specific underlying assumptions and rules of interpretation which are not transferable to another vocabulary. Thus scientists from different disciplines may use identical words, although in their usage these words may refer to totally different entities.) And third, the conceptual difficulties which make their appearance when a theory of theories has to be created to combine the concepts and findings of the various subdisciplines.
The Observer as Part of the System
One of the fundamental contributions that behavioral scientists have made to medicine, psychiatry, and all those disciplines that deal with interdisciplinary research is clarification of the role of the communication process in the collection and evaluation of data and in theory construction. 49 Any scientific information is composed of at least two components. One component contains statements which attribute features to the naturally existing system; these items refer to boundaries, structure, function, reversible and irreversible changes, growth, and relationship to other systems of the same or different order. The other component contains statements which attribute features to the human observer and his way of reporting scientific information; these include data about the position of the observer, the time of his observation, the dimensions of the observed phenomena relative to the time and space scales of the observer, the instruments of observation, the scientist's purpose and motivation in making the observation, his selectivity and bias, and above all his scientific codification system and his ways of communication. The more variable or incomplete the information is about the scientific observer, the less reliable are the inferences about the natural system. In the interdisciplinary, behavioral, and social sciences, the observer attributes are rather variable; whereas in the physical sciences the observer attributes are stable. In the establishment of any kind of scientific truth, therefore, the two RUESCH kinds of statements-the observer attributes and the natural system attributesstand in a relationship of complementarity. The more that is known about one, the less that is known about the other.
Orders of Relatedness
Although the behavioral scientists have scored some success in reuniting man with his environment and the observer with his scientific system, they have been less successful in pointing a way towards unifying the mind and the body. In scientific pursuits, three types of relatedness can be distinguished. These are known as causality, determinism, and interpretation. According to Born, "Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity D of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class where the word 'entity' means any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or e%' ent. A is called the cause, B the effect." 6 A different order of relatedness exists when events that occur at different dates have to be combined: "Determinism postulates that events at different times are connected by laws in such a way that predictions of unknown situations (past or future) can be made." 6 But in the behavioral sciences, laws of causality and determinism rarely can be ascertained. 30 Instead, there exist associations which Dewey and Bentley 11 have termed "transactions"-that is, processes that are not causally related. Living organisms are always engaged in transactions with self, with others, and with the wider surroundings. This mass of relationships, as Jaspers 28 has pointed out, can only be grasped by understanding and interpretation.
If we consider the subject matter of psychosomatic medicine in the light of these definitions, we discover that studies of personality structure, emotions, specific conflicts, 279 rarely have yielded scientific information which permits us invariably to predict or causally to connect these features with physiological variables or disease. We discover that most of the associations that have been established are of the interpretative type, a few are of the predictive type, and few if any are of the causal type. But that has to be expected. Only if the properties of the human observer are identical at different times of observation and his influence upon the observed phenomena is negligible can conclusions about determinism or causality be reached. Furthermore, investigators trained in different disciplines use varying scientific criteria and assumptions, and therefore causes defined in terms of one scientific universe cannot easily be related to effects observed in another scientific universe. For practical purposes, therefore, cause and effect relations can be established only within one and the same scientific universe. In consequence, interdisciplinary researchers have to be content with the establishment of transactional relations which help in the understanding and interpretation of man and nature.
Suitability of Time Segments
If simple juxtaposition or statistical correlation of psychological with physiological data has yielded only few significant associations, the fault lies primarily with the dimensions of the variables used. Frequently doctors attempt to relate personality features-that is, generalizations about behavior observed at different times over a period of decades-to momentary ocurrences in the physiology of the patient. Thus the level of abstraction and the time dimensions are incompatible. The situation changes in favor of more rigorous relatedness in studies of extreme conditions. Investigations of stress which approaches the tolerance limits of the individual, 53 of sensory deprivation, 56 sleep deprivation, 5 cerebral localization and experimental surgery, 42 animal conditioning, 17 and experimental diseases in animals, 16 Consequently a better appreciation of the influence of the observer upon the observed, proper choice of variables, and study of smaller time segments of behavior led to notable progress. 38 Because scientists obtain clearer answers when the time between cause and effect is short, experimenters have tended to avoid global abstractions and to confine themselves to the study of what is observable at the moment. This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the study of experimental imprinting in ducklings. The optimum age for imprinting is 13 to 16 hours after hatching, 32 hours being already too late. 25 Under the influence of the behavioral sciences, the "where," the "when," and the "how long" of any behavioral phenomenon in relation to its bodily concomitant is being given progressively more attention.
The Electronic Model:
Input and Output In working with one another, behavioral scientists had not only to clarify their scientific philosophies but also to develop theoretical models which would encompass the majority of mind-body and man-environment transactions. Under the influence of the communication engineers, behavioral scientists began to construct electronic models of the brain, the sense organs, and the communication system of man. 10 Although many parallels exist between giant computers and the central nervous system, 68 the electronic models so far have had little immediate impact upon psychosomatic medicine. Although aspects of human mental functioning such as calculation, prediction, and decision-making can to some extent be built into the machine,* 2 anxiety cannot. Apparently the nature of man's disordered conduct and of his diseases is not analogous to the breakdown of the machine. But inasmuch as this type of approach is but in its infancy, it is too early to evaluate the final contribution it can make to psychosomatic medicine.
While the man-machine analogy leaves much to be desired, behavioral scientists nonetheless have taken over a number of ideas from the engineers. Foremost among these is the notion of the "black box." In dealing with part of an electronic network, for example, the engineer need not concern himself with details. All he has to know are the input and output characteristics of that part of the network-let us say an electronic tube. Similarly, then, behavioral scientists have treated the intrapsychic functions of man as a "black box" and have concerned themselves with input and output. In the Pavlovian approach to human behavior, 17 or in Skinner's schemes for operant conditioning in animals and man, 61 behavior of the test subject is limited to a type that can be continuously and quantitatively studied. In this type of design, the behavioral scientists ignore the mediating mechanisms but measure what enters the organism and what comes out of it. 32 Such an approach differs radically from the psychoanalytic scheme in which input is neglected and verbal output is to a large measure equated with what goes on in the black box. While biological and psychological approaches always attribute some degree of autonomy to the individual, the electronic schemes reduce the person to a piece of machinery, the behavior of which is determined by built-in structural characteristics and controlled by input and output. The viewpoint of the engineers converges with that of the sociologists and anthropologists 27 in that they too regard the individual as a passive plaything of social forces.
Homeostasis, Values, and Biocultural
Parallelisms Homeostasis is a theoretical model that derives from biology. It postulates the ex-RUESCH istence of an optimal state which the organism strives to maintain with its regulatory mechanisms. Emerson emphasizes the parallelisms that exist between cultural and biological systems, distinguishing between homologues-that is, parallelisms in cause and effect relationships-and analogues, which constitute functional resemblances without causal ties. By means of homologies and analogies, behavioral scientists have tried to establish parallelisms between group and individual, leading, for example, to a comparison of social institutions with the individual's superego. 41 Value theory is, of course, one of the foremost devices for relating findings from different fields. It enables people to compare on a unitary scale that which is otherwise incomparable-even such things as baby shoes and whiskey.
91 Modern Q-sort methods represent an attempt to quantify people's operational values-that is, their selective-rejective behavior.
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The parallelisms between culture and the psychic structure of man have not had great practical significance for psychosomatic medicine. But the emphasis on culture and society gave birth to a variety of transcultural studies. 70 Here scientists search for cultural invariants-that is, forces, conflicts, or situations-that are likely to create conditions in which optimal functioning of man becomes impossible. These studies contribute to psychosomatic medicine knowledge about the parameters of the field in which human behavior and disease take place. The question, however, that remains unanswered is how these external conditions are related to disintegration and disease within the organism.
Symbolic Systems, Language, and Communication
Man relates to man by means of communication, and when this relatedness is interrupted, serious pathology develops.
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whiskerless rats 44 to patients who have given up hope 7 ' 37 ranges the evidence that communication is the link that makes the difference between life and death. Some American Marines and soldiers in World War II drowned in a few feet of water without having been seriously wounded, 45 and the high death rate among Americans in Korean prison camps was apparently related to the prisoners' apathy and withdrawal. 58 That anticipatory behavior and communication are necessary for survival has now been established beyond any doubt. But the question as to the mediating mechanisms remains one of the greatest puzzles of medicine. What is it that makes people feel better when they confess a sin, relate a traumatic memory, understand a heretofore obscure connection, or are given an appointment to see a psychiatrist three weeks hence? Unfortunately we abound with explanatory concepts, but the established facts are few. We do know that a signal, coded in words, when heard by a listener may influence not only his behavior but his health as well. We also know that an individual's silent thoughts may influence his organism and that a person who has mastered the intricacies of symbolic behavior and is given opportunities for satisfactory exchange is in a better state of health than one who is immature 48 or who is prevented by external conditions from communicating. But we have little if any information about the process by which messages-both intraorganismic and interpersonal-affect the individual's state of well-being.
In the exploration of symbolic behavior, psychoanalysts have been concerned mostly with the referential property and the meaning of symbols, 29 
'
35 while those interested in feedback processes have concentrated more on the quantitative aspects of signals and stimuli, on perception and networks, and on the effector system. 47 By tracing a signal from its origin through the sense organs and the central nervous system back through the muscles and into the outside world, behavioral scientists have found in 282 PSYCHOSOMATIC AND BEHAVIORAL ORIENTATIONS the study of messages a method which enables them to bridge various scientific universes. As a signal passes from person to person, the system of codification changes but the information remains the samesave for distortions, additions, or subtractions that occur at the points of transformation. 50 At the present time, the study of transformations and mediating mechanisms that convert visual or auditory signals into nervous and humoral impulses and these into contractions of the smooth and striped muscles presents a real challenge to investigators of psychosomatic phenomena.
Behavioral Scientist and Clinician
But, pending the accumulation of more knowledge, the clinician has to act upon incomplete information. The physician who treats patients always has to deal with human behavior. Questions as to how behavior is related to disease invariably arise in the minds of both doctor and patient. Answers have to be given to satisfy both the patient's and the doctor's need for certainty. Therefore, if facts are not available, fancy will take over. These circumstances perhaps are responsible for the abundance of explanatory concepts in psychosomatic medicine. Such concepts have to be regarded as devices which were designed to satisfy the causal thinking of the patient and to protect the physician in his ignorance. They are analogous to a placebo, 2 and as such represent an effective tool in the armamentarium of the therapist. If the communicative process between client and expert or patient and doctor requires the passing out of information, the giving of advice, or the making of decisions, then the explanatory concept can be evaluated not with criteria that pertain to the scientific method but only with those that apply to need-satisfaction in a person-to-person encounter. Although the medical and psychiatric concepts of Aristotle, Paracelsus, Mesmer, and Gall cannot qualify as scientific truths, they nonetheless fulfilled at their time an important communicative and therapeutic function.
The biological, medical, and behavioral sciences are but in their infancy. Few if any facts have been established that will withstand the test of time. But a trend is evident. Transcendental notions such as love and hate, mind and body, or being and having are indispensable for social intercourse or clinical practice; but in scientific inquiry we are slowly moving to a vocabulary of our own. That the language of the scientist has to have precise meanings and thus be different from the language of daily life is a fact that remains uncontested in the physical sciences. But psychiatrists particularly have been condemned for their terminologies-as if the science of behavior and psychopathology had to be comprehensible to all other people. Today we know for certain that the language of the scientist and that of the clinician fulfill different purposes and therefore cannot be identical. Behavioral scientists have devoted a lot of effort to inquiring into the processes of language, codification, information, and communication in order to create denotation systems which will help to ask meaningful questions and to formulate results. Some of these devices are along the lines of mathematical biology and symbolic logic, while others consist of simple technical vocabularies. Which of these methods will become dominant, only time can tell; but the divorce from clinical lingo is final.
Not all of the trends introduced by behavioral scientists were beneficial to psychosomatic medicine. Large-scale and expensive studies, survey teams, interdisciplinary staffs, and other mammoth enterprises of the 1940's and 1950's have yielded results which are meager in comparison to the time, money, and effort spent. The failure was due to a variety of reasons. The exploration of a chosen subject may take a lifetime, but most sponsored research projects are limited to a few years at the most. Great discoveries usually are made by individuals and not by teams. Only an RUESCH individual can integrate diversified knowledge; a team never can. Only the investigator himself can choose the topic that fits his personal motivation and interest. Only with a few collaborators can the researcher communicate effectively. The principal investigator cannot ordinarily see dozens of people during the day and engage in a profound exchange with them; in order to do this he would have to know them intimately, and they would have to be colleagues from his own discipline. What is needed today are conditions similar to those which existed thirty years ago, which would enable the investigator to function as an individual. But today the pressures of mass society, of bureaucracy, and of an economy of plenty interfere somewhat with the setting up of optimal conditions for creative work. The exploration of biological mechanisms, as exemplified in studies of imprinting, 25 the nature of love, 24 or the orientation devices of migratory birds, 8 illustrates how fundamental contributions can be made with relatively modest means.
But affluent society and machine are not alone to blame. If we medical men and psychiatrists would curb our need to encompass the whole universe at once and if we would content ourselves with smaller slices of knowledge, we perhaps might make more progress. Forsaking completeness and tolerating uncertainty would prevent us from introducing theoretical notions which give the impression that problems are solved but which actually serve to hide our ignorance. If Don Quixote fought windmills, we do even worse; we not only fight with windmills but we construct them in the first place. Some of the problems in psychosomatic medicine are precisely such windmills-products of our fantasy, our logic, and our language structure. However, there are some signs indicating that the introduction of the behavioral sciences into medical schools is changing the thinking of the medical scientists. They are no longer perturbed about differences between organic and functional, mind and body, organism and environment.
VOL. xxm, NO. 4, 1961 283 This new attitude is based upon an argument which runs as follows. Without a body, there is no behavior. Everything that has a body is governed by physical laws which can be ascertained by observation. Excluded from this observation by an outside observer, however, is inner experience. Only the self-observer can become aware of inner experience; as soon as he expresses himself in word or action, however, this inner experience becomes behavior that is accessible to the outer observer. Experiences of the inner observer cannot be correlated with any findings of the outer observer because the language system used is that of the outer observer. For example, all diseases are defined in terms of the outside observer; disease as inner experience makes no sense whatever because what is experienced is ill being, weakness, paralysis, hopelessness, or pain, but certainly not hypertension or duodenal ulcer or schizophrenia. It is not legitimate, therefore, to relate inner experience to physical pathology. Instead we should consider a correlation of the patient's words or actions with his pathology as a more scientific procedure. But this does not mean that as a healer the doctor should not use his own fantasy to imagine what the patient feels. Empathy is necessary for therapy; as a scientist, however, the physician has to use the language of the outside observer if he wishes to report the behavior of another person.
Summary
1. Psychosomatic medicine is not a subject that can be scientifically delineated. Instead, the field is determined by the attitude of physicians who wish to consider physical disease in the light of the behavior of the patient.
2. The correlation of behavior with physiological and pathological findings has revealed few if any causal connections, and the prediction of disease in the light of certain behavior has not been too successful. Instead, a host of transactions have been discovered that link disease to emotions in an as yet nonspecified way.
3. While established tacts are few in psychosomatic medicine, there is a multitude of theoretical notions that are designed to bridge the gaps in our knowledge; but most of these concepts beg the question of the mediating mechanisms that transform inner experience into bodily pathology and vice versa.
4. The contributions of behavioral scientists to psychosomatic medicine have consisted of clarifying the methodology used in the study of human behavior, identifying the potentially or actually harmful situations, and specifying some of the deleterious human interactions and ways of communication.
5. What is needed are focused rather than general, small-scale rather than largescale, and well-controlled studies of the mediating mechanisms that link psychosocial events with changes in the bodily tissues.
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